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Abstract

This paper seeks to explore the sources of substantive divergence between the antitrust
regimes of the U.S. and EC and to present a framework upon which harmonization could
potentially be achieved. While the rise of the Chicago School and post-Chicago theory
have merged to ensure a central role for economics in dictating antitrust enforcement in
the United States, no such clear standard has emerged in Europe. The consequences for
firms operating on a transatlantic basis are potentially severe, as they have to formulate
different business strategies depending on which jurisdiction they operate in. An
assessment of EC law demonstrates an interesting amalgam of conflicting jurisprudential
bases, including the overriding goal of achieving single market integration, the pervasive,
though subtle, presence of ordoliberal thought and a qualified desire to protect small
competitors from more efficient rivals. It will be argued that the transatlantic schism
currently witnessed is not inevitable and that the unique roles played by competition
policy in the EC do not prohibit the employment of price theoretic principles.

This paper will seek to articulate a basis for the asymmetry in treatment given certain
business practices by the U.S. and EC. Doing so will enable businesses to more readily
understand the construction given corporate behavior by European authorities and to
adopt their strategies accordingly. Moreover, a framework will be advanced that is
facilitative of modern economic theory and which would, if universally employed,
bring Europe not only to harmonization with the United States but to theend toward
which it is already gravitating.
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Exploring the Source of Transatlantic Antitrust Divergence

•

Introduction

Competition law, as a distinct discipline, has been subject to a fascinating and turbulent
history.1 Inextricably linked to such fields as economics, politics and sociology, vigorous
debate has ensued as to the proper manner in which to employ the potent provisions
antitrust has at its disposal.2 Such divisive discourse has ultimately failed to produce a
clear standard enjoying the support of a plain majority of the world’s commentators. The
result has been a plethora of arguably flawed case law, flowing from a ubiquitous judicial
failure to derive and articulate a consistent and sound body of principles from the
internally inconsistent, and often diametrically opposed, academic literature.3 Much of
the ensuing jurisprudence can be characterized by the adoption of economically illiterate
principles, due to courts’ intuition in a field where the economic effect of various
business practices may be strongly counter-intuitive.4

1

See generally RUDOLPH J.R. PERITZ, COMPETITION POLICY IN AMERICA: HISTORY, RHETORIC,
LAW. (Oxford University Press 2000); DAVID J. GERBER, LAW AND COMPETITION IN TWENTIETH
CENTURY EUROPE: PROTECTING PROMETHEUS (Oxford University Press 2001).
2
Compare, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (University of Chicago Press 2d ed. 2001),
with Robert Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051 (1979), with
Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257
(2001).
3
See generally ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF (2d
ed. 1993) (discussing how the numerous political and socioeconomic ends toward which
competition policy have been historically applied ultimately resulted in a confused body of law,
full of inherently contradictory legal provisions.)
4
Tim Brennan, Do advances in economic theory lead to advances in legal practice? The Legacy
of U.S. v. Microsoft, (2003) at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv26n4/v26n4-3.pdf (“In
the… “pre-Chicago,” era, which lasted until the 1970s, economics took a back seat to
impressionistic assessments of harm.”)
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Such unconsidered, and oftentimes intellectually erroneous, judicial interpretation
provided the backdrop to the rise of the Chicago School in the 1980s – a body of thought
dedicated to the employment of microeconomic theory as the tool by which to formulate
competition rules for the sole benefit of consumers.5 Chicago has been met with opposing
degrees of warmth on opposite sides of the Atlantic.6 The gulf has been further
exacerbated by the rise of post-Chicago theory, calling for the combination of dynamic
game theory with empiricism.7 Meanwhile, Europe remains concerned with numerous
issues that do not trouble U.S. antitrust enforcers. Particularly prevalent amongst these is
the overriding goal of furthering single market integration through the employment of
competition law.8 Moreover, and as will be explored in detail below, a highly distinctive
school of socio-economic thought, known as ordoliberalism, continues to pervade the law
of the European Union.

As a result of the foregoing, the aspiration of achieving ubiquitous cooperation and
uniformity through international antitrust harmonization faces a difficult, and what is
perhaps a unique, challenge within the broader realm of international legal
synchronization more generally.9 Strong divergence in opinion continues to arise as to
how to best apply antitrust principles, or, perhaps more accurately, for whose benefit
those principles ought to be applied.
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Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 925 (1979).
See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton & Dr. Stefan Schmitz, A Tale of Two Continents: The Coming
Clash of the Conflicting Economic Viewpoints in Europe and the United States, at
http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/205.htm.
7
See generally, Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 2.
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See, e.g., RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW (Butterworths 4th ed. 2003) at 18 – 20.
9
See, e.g., Pitofsky, Competition Policy in a Global Economy – Today and Tomorrow, (Nov. 4,
1998), at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/global.htm.
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In surveying the field as a whole, twoparticularly forceful insights have struck the
author: (1) international synchronization in the context of such asymmetric theoretical
underpinnings between and within jurisdictions poses a singular challenge, and (2)
resolution of the inconsistencies underlying different jurisdictions’ competition policies
requires the identification, and ultimate acceptance, of a single foundational standard.

The focus of the following study shall, therefore, be on the extent and source of
divergence between the two most important jurisdictions within the sphere of antitrust,
namely the European Community and the United States. While there has been quite
ostensible success to date in international antitrust cooperation between these two
jurisdictions,10 it is clear that quite succinct distinctions exist and have been brought to
the limelight in dramatic fashion in recent years. Foremost amongst these in terms of
substantive divergence is the failed GE/Honeywell merger, which was vetoed in Europe,
after having been approved in America.11 It certainly seems that international
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See, e.g., Pamela Jones Harbour, Remarks before NYSBA International Law and Practice
Section, Developments in Competition Law in the European Union and the United States:
Harmony and Conflict, (Oct. 21, 2005) (transcript available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/harbour/051021competitionlaw.pdf) (“From my perspective… there
is far more harmony than conflict among US and EU competition enforcers. Furthermore, while
we cannot rule out future conflicts, I believe that the trend is towards more convergence and
harmony.”); Margaret Bloom, The U.S. and EU Move Towards Substantial Antitrust
Convergence on Consumer Welfare Based Enforcement, ANTITRUST, Vol. 19, No. 3 18, 22
(Summer 2005). See also Randolph W. Tritell, International Antitrust Convergence: A Positive
View, (Summer 2005) at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/international/docs/tritellpostiveview.pdf;
Remarks of Chairman Robert Pitofsky, EU and U.S. Approaches to International Mergers Views from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, before European Commission Merger Control
10th Anniversary Conference, The European Commission Directorate General for Competition,
International Bar Association, Metropole Hotel, Brussels, Belgium, (14-15 Sept. 2000), at
www.europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf
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Compare U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Requires Divestitures
General Electric and Honeywell (May 2, 2001), at
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harmonization has yet to achieve unqualified success and that the source of this
shortcoming lies in the answer to one, misleadingly simple, question: to what ultimate
end should competition law be applied?12

•

The Transatlantic Divide

An economic approach to competition policy, which aims to promote consumer welfare
by minimizing deadweight loss through the maximization of industrial output, today
plays an increasingly important role in the function and application of competition law in
the European Community.13 In particular, there is evidence that an economic approach to
antitrust policy is becoming more widely accepted.14 Yet, in contrast to the United States,
such an approach has yet to emerge as the primary and exclusively correct manner in
which to apply competition law.15 Even a cursory examination of the case law reveals a
strong desire on the part of European authorities to apply competition law with fairness in
mind – a position abandoned in the U.S. following the Warren Court’s era.16
Concordantly, European competition policy is best described, at present, as constituting
an amalgam of various philosophic, political and economic policies and ideals. The result

http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2001/8140.htm, with General
Electric/COMP/M.2220, EC Decision of July 3, 2001, at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m2220_en.pdf.
12
Charles A. James, International Antitrust in the 21st Century: Cooperation and Convergence,
(Oct. 17, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9330.pdf.
13
See, e.g., William J. Kolasky, U.S. and EU competition policy: Cartels, Mergers, and Beyond,
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9848.pdf.
14
See, e.g., RICHARD WHISH, supra note 8.
15
See, e.g., Alasdair Murray, deputy director of the Centre for European Reform, Consumers and
EU Competition Policy, (Sept. 2005), at http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybrief_consumers.pdf.
16
See, e.g., David J. Gerber, Fairness in Competition Law: European and U.S. Experience, at
http://www.kyotogakuen.ac.jp/~o_ied/information/fairness_in_competition_law.pdf (Mar. 5,
2004).
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is a body of law with somewhat conflicting objectives and principles which combine to
create a significant challenge for international antitrust harmonization.

It is this distinction in philosophical outlook that has led to, what at times have been,
quite major departures from the goal of achieving horizontal uniformity.17

Some of the criticism emanating from the United States has denounced the European
Community for simply employing competition policy in a manner designed to benefit
competitors, as opposed to consumers.18 “U.S. law protects consumers, not competitors”
has been the cry.19 The axiomatic inference is that EC law has been, or is, applied without
primary importance being placed on the consumer and that European competition law is,
perhaps, biased in its application. Nepotism toward both “state champions” and small
companies is a typical complaint.20

Nevertheless, this paper will attempt to articulate a more perspicacious view to the effect
that criticisms of the above nature may be fallacious, specious and ultimately obtuse
insofar as they omit consideration of a most fundamental possibility – that perhaps EC
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Charles A. James, supra note 12 (concluding that the EC/U.S. rift with respect to
GE/Honeywell can only be explained by a diametrically opposed fundamental view as to the role
of competition law, rather than by any lack of cooperation.)
18
See Department of Justice Press Release, Statement by Assistant Attorney General
Charles A. James on the EU’s Decision Regarding the GE/Honeywell Acquisition ( July
3, 2001), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press releases/2001/8510.htm.
19
John R. Wilke, U.S. Antitrust Chief Criticizes EU Decision to Reject Merger of GE and
Honeywell, WALL ST. J., July 5, 2001, at A3 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Charles James:
“Clear and longstanding U.S. antitrust policy holds that the antitrust laws protect competition, not
competitors… [the European Commission’s decision] reflects a significant point of divergence.”)
20
See. e.g., Hal R. Varian, Economic Scene; In Europe, GE and Honeywell ran afoul of 19thcentury thinking, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2001.
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competition law is indeed attempting to promote consumer welfare, though in a manner
distinctive from, and occasionally diametrically opposed to, the path taken in the United
States.21 This omission may be fatal within the context of international harmonization, for
an effective sine qua non for the successful attainment thereof is that all jurisdictions
understand the fundamental goals of each other’s systems. Progressive attempts to
synchronize laws will undoubtedly encounter many obstacles if both sides do not enjoy
full knowledge of the other’s starting point.22

In this regard, it is most certainly not helpful when commentators on one side condemn a
body of the law without understanding the source of the divergence in question. Such
simplistic criticism serves only to engrain a fundamental view, in this case with respect to
how best to promote consumer welfare, which is perhaps anachronistic. Interestingly, nor
is it helpful when European officials proclaim an approach to consumer welfare
analogous to that followed in the United States if such an analogy is, in fact,
inappropriate. In other words, there is reason to believe that recent statements by highranking European officials may be somewhat nugatory, as they are not made in the
context of a concomitant aspiration to narrow the prevailing wisdom in Europe regarding
the role of consumer welfare so as to more closely match the jurisprudence in the United
States.23 It is submitted that such recent, pro-claimed statements are more strongly

21

See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton & Dr. Stefan Schmitz, supra note 6.
Charles A. James, supra note 12 (“Cooperation alone will not resolve some significant areas of
difference among antitrust regimes that must be addressed if we are to maintain the integrity of
antitrust on a global stage.”)
23
See, e.g., Neelie Kroes, European Competition Policy – Delivering Better Markets and Better
Choices, (15 Sept. 2005), at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/512&format=HTML&
22
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indicative of a fear of being criticized abroad than they are of a fundamental shift in
policy. Take, for instance, the recent comments of the European Competition
Commissioner, Neelie Kroes:

“I am aware that it is often suggested that – unlike Section 2 of the Sherman Act –
Article 82 is intrinsically concerned with “fairness” and therefore not focused
primarily on consumer welfare…
My own philosophy on this is fairly simple. First, it is competition, and not
competitors, that is to be protected. Second, ultimately the aim is to avoid
consumers harm.”24

At first glance, this is tremendously encouraging and could be construed as a
commitment on the part of the head of the European competition authority to actively
shape European antitrust law into a body of principles more akin to those in the United
States, by adopting the principal tenet of the Chicago School – protecting consumers, but
not competitors. However, given the history of EC competition law, there is reason to be
skeptical. In addition, and in the context of the above comments, Neelie Kroes
emphasized that: “it is not our intention to propose a radical shift in enforcement
policy.”25

Nevertheless, insofar as these remarks evidence some desire within the Commission to
apply European competition rules in a manner more firmly guided by the economics of
industrial organization, there is reason to take heart.
aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (“Consumer welfare is now well established as the
standard the Commission applies when assessing mergers and infringements of the Treaty rules.”)
24
Neelie Kroes, Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82, (23 Sept. 2005), at
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/537&format=HTML&
aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
25
Id.
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In contrast to some of the simplistic criticism of the European approach, this paper shall
attempt to demonstrate that the divergence in policy between the two jurisdictions rests
on something quite subtle and reflects, in part, Europe’s continuing adherence to the
basic tenets of the Freiburg School, the details of which shall be discussed momentarily.
It shall be argued that the European authorities have indeed attempted to employ
competition law to maximize consumer welfare, but that such attempts have occasionally
been guided by a theory in direct contradiction to the basic teaching of the Chicago
School. A natural, and highly important, off-shoot of this insight will relate to the relative
wisdom of employing these conflicting ideologies, particularly with respect to the new
economy.

This last question will bring us full circle and to the ultimate conclusion that, although
perhaps suffering from myopia in failing to realize that protection of competitors from
one another is not the goal of EC competition law, but rather a consequence of the
manner in which it seeks to promote consumer welfare, the criticism emanating from the
United States may nonetheless be justified insofar as it demonstrates that the European
definition of consumer welfare is no longer – if it ever was – appropriate in light of
modern economic theory.

Therefore, the first step, after extrapolating the foundational features of the Chicago and
Freiburg Schools, will be to make a definitive inquiry as to the relative advantages of the
two schools – broadly defined – and to make an argument for the adoption of an optimal
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route. This exercise will provide two benchmarks for those seeking international
harmonization, namely the identification of the source of divergence, as well as the best
route away from this point. In this regard, price theory will be demonstrated to be the
key. It will be argued that the EC’s expansionist definition of consumer welfare is no
longer appropriate, particularly with respect to the emergence of the new economy.26

Having concluded that consumer welfare, defined in the economic sense, ought to be the
sole guide in employing competition law, the second step will be to examine the
preceding theory and conclusions within the context of particular aspects of antitrust
jurisprudence. In this regard, it is submitted that the roots of divergence can be most
accurately delineated, and the optimum approach identified, when ascertained from the
perspective of a select number of confined areas of competition law. The same route
could conceivably be undertaken within the realm of any number of alternative business
practices and the legal reactions to them, but predatory pricing, refusals to supply and
product tying provide the ideal test cases.

It is the ultimate contention of this paper that the fundamental distinction between the EC
and U.S. competition regimes relates not to whether the protection and promotion of
consumer welfare should be the ultimate aspiration of antitrust policy, but on opposing
views on how best to meet this goal. In other words, there is evidence that the difference
between the two regimes is not as to what end to employ antitrust law, but as to how best
26

This conclusion is by no means inescapable. Cf. Thomas J. Horton & Dr. Stefan Schmitz, supra
note 6 (concluding that the DoJ and FTC will have to “become more responsive to the new wave
of economic liberalism in future antitrust enforcement efforts” by making a move toward the
European model of promoting consumer welfare “or risk losing their historical positions as the
leaders of worldwide antitrust enforcement efforts.”)
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to get there. This is an encouraging insight and one that is obscured by the kind of
uncritical criticism that has been leveled upon the EC by various U.S. commentators. It is
encouraging because, each having recognized that the other desires the same outcome, it
is merely a matter of debate and academic discourse as to whose approach, or whether an
amalgam of both approaches, should emerge as the sole standard by which to employ the
principles of competition law.

Yet, at a pragmatic level, it is undeniable that significant difficulty lies ahead in
harmonizing the laws of the respective jurisdictions. This difficulty emanates from the
fact that the ultimate divergence is with respect to political policy and any major
alteration in course will require a fundamental shift in political thinking. Nevertheless,
achieving the goal of harmonization need not be quixotic and it is hoped that the
following academic study will be ultimately reflective of a larger, self-critical drive
toward achieving harmonization.

•

The Pertinent Schools of Jurisprudence

This Section begins by looking to the foundations of U.S. antitrust law, with particular
emphasis being placed on the rise of the Chicago School and the subsequent, widespread
acceptance of its teachings, qualified only by the corrections of post-Chicago economics.
The discussion relating to the above will, by design, be compendious, given the vast
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literature already available on the subject and the ubiquitous understanding of the modern
development of U.S. antitrust policy. Moreover, the focus will not be historical for a
definite standard has emerged as dominant and has been applied in a largely unqualified
manner.27 Thus, given this paper’s focus on harmonization, there seems little reason to
recount defunct, historical details of American antitrust which have been largely
discredited by the modern law. Instead, an accurate overview of the approach taken in
America will suffice.

In contrast, the historical context to European law, and the various jurisprudential
foundations which underlie it, continue to have a significant impact on the substantive
law. Thus, far more attention will be paid to the sources and evolution of EC competition
law, for, in addition to their continuing relevance, the significance of these facts have
often escaped academic criticism and yet play a role of the most fundamental importance
in explaining the divergence between EC and U.S. antitrust law.

•

The Chicago School

It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the Chicago School of economic thought on
the development of competition policy over the past thirty years. This paper will not seek
to recount the intricacies of the school in detail, for they are already well understood.28
However, a compendious discussion of the fundamental tenets of the school and the
27

Certain aspects of U.S. antitrust policy– including product tying – remain inconsistent with
Chicago and post-Chicago economics, but these are part of a clear minority.
28
See generally Richard A. Posner, supra note 5.
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influence it has had on antitrust law provide the necessary foundation from which to
consider the nature and direction of competition policy on both sides of the Atlantic.

In order to understand the Chicago School approach to antitrust, one must appreciate the
economic objections to monopoly, for it is against such evils that Chicagoans seek to
employ competition law.

•

Objections to monopoly

The basic objection to monopoly results from the profit-maximizing strategy pursued by
an undertaking which is unconstrained by competition, both actual and potential. In
maximizing profits, a monopolist will produce at the point where the marginal cost of
producing another unit of output equals the marginal revenue which would be gained by
selling that unit.29 As a monopolist faces a downward-sloping demand curve, the price it
charges for a given unit will necessarily be larger than the marginal cost of producing that
unit.30 As a result, the monopolist earns positive economic profits.

Why the objection? There are two fundamental reasons. First, by charging a price above
marginal cost, a deadweight loss is created for society in the form of foregone
transactions that would have taken place but for the supracompetitive pricing.31
Essentially, there are consumers who value the product or service at a level at or beyond

29

See CARLTON & PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, at 91.
Id. at 89.
31
See, e.g., JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MICROECONOMICS, 2d Ed at 357 – 361; WALDMAN & JENSEN,
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION, 2d Ed at 42 – 44.
30

14

the marginal cost to society of producing it, but who are nevertheless denied access to it.
As a result, there is a loss in value as some consumers satisfy their demand by switching
to goods that require more of society’s scarce resources to produce.32 In this sense,
perverse incentives are created: a consumer believes he is acquiring an equivalent
product, but in fact is purchasing a product that costs society more to produce.33 This is
the necessary consequence of a restriction in industry-wide output and hence, in many
analyses of allegedly anticompetitive practices, a competition authority or court will look
to empirical and theoretical evidence of whether or not the challenged practices are
output-enhancing or output-restricting. The answer to this question will necessarily
provide an insight into whether deadweight loss is decreasing or increasing.

The second objection to above-marginal cost pricing is that it creates perverse incentives
on the part of a would-be monopolist to expend resources on acquiring and maintaining a
monopolistic position. At the limit, such an undertaking would be willing to spend a sum
equal to the discounted present value of its expected monopoly profits on obtaining that
position.34 This behavior is known as rent-seeking and such expenditure constitutes social
waste.35

A further concern, which is often articulated, is known as x-inefficiency. X-inefficiency
refers to the idea that a monopolist, which does not have to remain competitive against
rivals to stay in business, has less incentive than a competitive firm to be efficient by

32

See POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 6th Ed at 278.
See RICHARD POSNER, supra note 2.
34
Id.
35
See, generally, POSNER, supra note 32, at 279 – 280.
33
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minimizing its costs.36 Whereas the first two concerns outlined above are acknowledged
as genuine by most economic commentators, the concept of x –inefficiency is somewhat
more controversial.37 Specifically, many feel that the underlying tenets of the concept are
contradictory: insofar as it is assumed that a rational firm is a profit-maximizer, the
assumption that a monopolist declines to maximize profits by failing to minimize costs in
inconsistent with the underlying assumption.38 Nevertheless, the concern is sufficiently
well-known as to justify its inclusion, albeit accompanied with a qualification.

•

The Arguments of the Chicago School

The Chicago approach to antitrust policy is aimed solely at avoiding the various evils
associated with monopoly identified above. Therefore, the twin aims of maximizing
consumer welfare and allocative efficiency emerge as the combined source of
competition policy. To achieve these aims, Chicagoans look to price theory as the means
by which to inform the construction of efficiency- and wealth-maximizing rules.

The result of such an application of price theory was a surprising discovery – virtually all
business practices condemned by the law, particularly unilateral actions, were benign
when construed economically. Aaron Director and others at the University of Chicago
quickly discovered that the explanations put forward by the courts for business conduct

36

Id. at 281.
See, generally, RICHARD POSNER, supra note 2 at 18.
38
See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 29, at 94 (“Monopolies want to maximize profits, and
the only way a firm can do so is to minimize its costs at its chosen output level.”)
37
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believed to be objectionable could not withstand economic and logical scrutiny.39 Only
horizontal price fixing and horizontal mergers of considerable size were regarded by the
Chicago School as being worthy of condemnation.40

Diametrically opposed to the Chicago approach is the protection of inefficient
competitors against their more efficient, generally larger, rivals. Such protection serves
only to frustrate the attainment of efficiencies and to perpetuate the existence of
inefficient business whose presence in the market is socially wasteful. Chicagoans
therefore prescribe a Darwinian approach to competition policy and a concomitant faith
in the ability of natural market forces to ensure efficient outcomes more readily than can
judicial intervention.

The message that the competitive process is best furthered by refusing both to protect
competitors and to prevent their exclusion from markets as a result of competitor action
may seem, at first glance, somewhat paradoxical. But the paradox is resolved by FTC
Chairman Deborah Platt Majors, who recently explained:

“I often am asked, particularly in Europe, “how it is that we can have competition
without competitors?”
Good question. We support competition because it will lead to efficiencies. But
competition can be fierce and someone may “lose.” We do not seek to prop up the
“loser” just to keep it in the game. And we do not seek to tame the competition,

39

See, e.g., Aaron Director & Edward Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, N.W. U. L.
REV. 281 (1956).
40
See generally Bork, supra note 3, at 221 (“mergers of up to 60 or 70 percent of the market
should be permitted.”)
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through anticompetitive regulation or enforcement, to assist a rent-seeking
rival.”41

The Chicago School has been immensely influential under U.S. law, particularly during
the 1980s, and although its extreme conclusions calling for general per se legality have
been undermined by “post-Chicago” advances,42 it seems clear that Chicago’s lasting
effect will involve economics being viewed as the appropriate source of U.S. competition
law.

As is widely observed, and as will become readily apparent, the Chicago School has not
enjoyed the level of acceptance in Europe that it has commanded across the Atlantic.43
This is presumably due to the fact that the Chicago approach is undeniably harsh in
application and notions of general equity, in addition to the socioeconomic policies to be
discussed shortly, likely constrain European policy setters. The process of competition by
which consumers benefit is unforgiving and “punishes the unfortunate as well as the
inefficient.”44

Nevertheless, the manner in which inefficient competitors give way to their superior
rivals is a simple manifestation of Darwinian theory in action and allowing unfettered
competition has overriding advantages. It falls to economists to counter highly influential
stakeholders by advocating the superior, though not immediately apparent, benefits of
allowing competition to thrive unhindered. Justice Easterbrook writes most succinctly:
41

Remarks by Federal Trade Commission Chairman Deborah Platt Majoras on “U.S. antitrust
practice -- how does it affect European Business?” (Apr. 7, 2005), at http:/www.useu.be
42
See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, supra note 2.
43
See, e.g., Thomas J. Horton & Dr. Stefan Schmitz, supra note 6.
44
ROBERT BORK, supra note 3.

18

“[A] producer's loss is no concern of the antitrust laws, which protect consumers
from suppliers rather than suppliers from each other. If [the practice in question]
should be called unfair competition, it is nonetheless competition. Competition is
ruthless, unprincipled, uncharitable, unforgiving-and a boon to society, Adam
Smith reminds us, precisely because of these qualities that make it a bane to other
producers… the plaintiff's complaint is too much competition (injuring producers)
rather than too little (injuring consumers). Entertaining claims of excessive
competition would undermine the functions of the antitrust laws.”45

Adherence to these Darwinian principles has been far from unqualified in Europe. This is
so for a number of reasons, the most obvious of which relates to equity, by which
competitors are protected against the unfair actions of their more powerful rivals. More
subtly, however, a number of unique jurisprudential foundations underlie EC competition
law which bear significant explanatory power.

The following pages trace the highly important philosophical foundations of EC
competition policy so as to explain Europe’s general hostility to an unqualified
application of Chicago principles.

•

The Protection of Politically Influential Businesses

Antitrust law, by the very nature of the subject matter it seeks to regulate, raises sensitive
political issues. Foremost amongst these is the affinity many people have for family-run,
small business, regarding it both as a source of livelihood for the fine people who run

45

See, e.g., Stamatakis Industries, Inc. v. King, 965 F.2d 469, 471 (1992).
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them and as a good within society, providing a more human counter to, what is perhaps
perceived to be, the increasingly impersonal nature of large corporations. Politically
charged situations often arise when the entry of a large corporation into a neighborhood
or larger market traditionally served by family-owned business results in the
displacement of the latter by the former. Strong sympathies arise in the eyes of the public
for the plight of the small business-owner trying to provide a living for his family. Such
sympathies are, of course, both valid and understandable. Being a function of the political
process, it is hardly surprising when antitrust law begins to incorporate such political
sympathies in its jurisprudence.

Nevertheless, the Chicago School has condemned the employment of competition law for
these purposes, referring to the kind of political empathy that motivates it as
“uncritical.”46 While the loss caused by the arrival of large, efficient corporations is
evident for all to see in the form of the displaced incumbent, the many losses arising from
the prevention of such displacement are more subtle and no competition regime can claim
to act responsibly if the gains of allowing free entry and competition are not weighed
against the losses. This is why dogmatic and simplistic reaction to political sympathies,
without factoring in the concomitant benefits, could be deemed inane.

So, what are the losses inherent in employing competition law to prohibit free
competition on the merits when less efficient business will be injured? The first, and
axiomatic, loss relates to the economic objections to monopoly highlighted above. By
curtailing the expansion of a large firm’s market share to avail of the various efficiencies
46
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underlying its production and distribution processes, competition law effectively reduces
the level of industrial output, raises the market clearing price and augments deadweight
loss. In addition to the myriad of negative effects associated with such loss, the incentive
on the part of potentially successful firms to engage in the expensive research and
development needed to attain that superiority is blunted, due to the restriction on an
efficient firm’s abilities to avail of its meliority. Consumers will inevitably lose in the
long-run as they are denied access to the fruits of innovation that free competition would
have provided them.

Moreover, pragmatic as well as theoretical objections arise. First is the major problem of
articulating a coherent and consistent body of legal principles in formulating an antitrust
policy protective of politically favored business. Attempting to employ law to such an
end is apt to result in a series of diametrically-opposed and self-contradictory principles,
which have to be applied in an ad hoc fashion in order to achieve particularized justice.47
While this may lead to equitable outcomes in certain, particular cases, in the long run the
lack of legal certainty is likely to lead to further blunting of incentives on the part of
market actors, whose efforts are value-adding to society.

Consider the case of a court employing competition law in furtherance of politicallyfavored business to prohibit the acquisition of a small business by a larger corporation.48
Prima facie, such a prohibition would seem to be in the best interests of the small
business-owner specifically and the small business community generally. The owner may
47
48
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continue in business unperturbed. Yet, closer analysis demonstrates the clear fallacy of
this reasoning. In attempting to aid the small business-owner now, the court may
inadvertently hurt the community as a whole by reducing the expected return of starting
one’s own business. With such acquisitions prohibited, the small business owner cannot
sell his company. Moreover, it is not clear that the owner purportedly protected by the
court’s decision will, in fact, be left better off. More likely, the larger firm will enter the
market regardless and, instead of acquiring his business, will simply price him out of the
market. The court’s decision, while enacted with the intention of aiding the small
businessman’s plight, has in fact hurt him.49 To prevent ensuing damage, the court would
have to forbid pricing below the prevailing price set by the small business owner. But this
is tantamount to banning competition entirely and represents such a strong application of
the protectionist argument that no court could, or would, ever employ it.

While it may be concluded that the costs of applying competition rules in protectionist
fashion are likely to exceed the benefits, this does not mean that the Chicago view
prevails in practice. In contrast, this all leads to an unavoidable clash between economists
and politically influential stakeholders. While the United States has seen an almost
unqualified victory for the economic view, with the Robinson-Patman Act against price
discrimination providing a quite dramatic exception with politically favored, small
business interests winning out,50 both current European and historical American law
appear to display an uneasy balance between the two. Perhaps the clearest illustration of
protectionism emerges not from Europe, but from the United States during the Warren
49
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Court era. Ironically, the case so often cited for the Supreme Court’s proclamation that
“antitrust protects competition, not competitors” is Brown Shoe, perhaps the
quintessential United States judgment in favor of the protection of individual
competitors!51

The uneasy balance between economics and politics creates a significant danger of courts
following the Brown Shoe approach – adhering to the political goal, whilst proclaiming
adherence to the other. It follows that one must be skeptical of a court’s alleged
unqualified adoption of the economic approach, for the countervailing political influence
is considerable and can be expected to permeate through the judicial process.

Of fundamental importance to this Section, therefore, is the identification of whether EC
competition law is currently applied to protect competitors as a goal in itself or whether
such protection is the by-product of a larger purpose. Moreover, if there is a distinction,
the question must also be asked as to whether the distinction matters. The key to
achieving all of this is to look to the role of the Freiburg School under European law.

A final manifestation of protectionism arises with respect to the deliberate frustration of
politically disfavored business. For example, there are those who believe that the
fundamental reason for the prohibition of the GE/Honeywell merger by the European
Commission was political. In other words, it has been argued that had the strengthening
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23

of two European companies been at issue, the merger would presumably have been
approved.52

Nevertheless, there is reason to be skeptical of such political conspiracy theories. For one,
there has been an unprecedented level of international cooperation between the U.S. and
EC and it seems strange indeed that such cooperation would suddenly be dispensed with
for no good reason. Second, and more importantly, the reasoning behind the
Commission’s decision with respect to GE/Honeywell makes perfect sense when
construed in light of the evolution of European competition law, the various philosophies
pervading it, and the case law interpreting it. This will become clear momentarily when
the Freiburg School is considered and the practical differences between ordoliberalism
and mere protectionism identified.

As has been made clear, insofar as protectionist principles still pervade European law,
there is strong ground for repealing them. A more difficult argument awaits with respect
to the suitability of Freiburg ideology.

•

The Overriding Importance of the Market Integration Objective
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Before considering the Freiburg School, however, it is necessary to discuss what is
perhaps the most important function of EC competition law, namely facilitating the
furtherance of single market integration. The goal of realizing a single, integrated market
through the working of a legal competition framework is unique amongst the world’s
antitrust regimes. In this sense, European antitrust law seeks to serve a goal which has no
parallel under U.S. law and this observation alone necessitates the question of whether
complete harmonization of law between the EC and U.S. is desirable, let alone
achievable. This challenge shall be considered in due course.

A ubiquitous and unwavering trend in EC competition law has involved the unhesitating
condemnation of any business practice seen as creating an obstacle to inter-Member State
trade or in a manner otherwise likely to frustrate the integration of the single market. An
example of such an instance is the case of Consten & Grundig, where a manufacturer
granted one of its dealers an exclusive territory (France).53 Refusing to hear any
economic justifications, the ECJ condemned the agreement as being contrary to Article
81 EC due to its impediment to single market integration.

Yet, it may be seen that this is a highly debatable proposition, for it ignores such factors
as interbrand competition and the fact that implementation of the distributorship could
actually have increased trade between France and other countries. Here the Court can be
seen suffering from myopia. It is indeed true that the restriction imposed by the
distributor created an insurmountable obstacle to those wishing to engage in intrabrand
competition in France from other Member States. Yet, the Court did not consider the
53
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likely long-term effect of the restriction on net, interbrand competition between Member
States. It may well have been that the distributorship was a risky venture and the
distributor required intrabrand protection in order to enable him to rationally take that
risk. The restriction, while creating an intrabrand obstacle to the single market, would
seem to have facilitated an increase in interbrand competition. This elevated level of
competition would result in higher demand and, hence, higher output. Ceteris paribus,
one would expect a higher degree of inter-Member State trade, hence furthering the goals
of the European Community.

This demonstrates how the European Court’s dismissal of economics may have been a
mistake. The economics of a particular situation must always be assessed to ascertain
whether a short-run barrier to integration may, in fact, lead to long-run furtherance of the
single market. It cannot be confidently stated, however, that a pure Chicago approach in
furtherance of allocative efficiency will always further the single market integration
principle. In instances where elevated levels of consumer wealth within a particular part
of the European Union are likely to have a deleterious, long-run effect on free trade
between Member States, the European Court may be right to strike down the practice.
But this power must be tempered, without exception, by two considerations: (1) the level
of integration that has already taken place over the history of the European Union renders
the principle less worthy of unqualified superiority as in the past,54 & (2) augmented
allocative efficiency may indirectly further the goals of the single market.
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Interestingly, the single market imperative shares many of the same features in
application as the Freiburg School, particularly with respect to fairness and the
elimination of exclusionary practices.55 By preventing mergers likely to increase
concentration, even if not prices,56 and by holding illegal those unilateral and concerted
practices designed to make entry into a particular market more time-consuming or costly,
even where those practices increase efficiency, EC competition law attempts to ensure
that market actors in various states are granted equal and unrestricted access to the
relevant market.

Nevertheless, and somewhat counter-intuitively, it is submitted as the major insight of
this Section that an application of an economic approach to antitrust policy may, in fact,
serve to further the important European goal of integration, while at the same time
promoting a more competitive and efficient single market. In other words, the presence of
barriers – artificial and otherwise – may in many circumstances serve to further long-run
integration, even if short-term entry is delayed or frustrated. Impressionistic assessment
of obstacles to single market integration may not only do a disservice to that goal, but
also frustrate the emergence of an efficiency-enhancing competition policy.
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•

The Freiburg School

The Freiburg School of ordoliberal thought plays a central role in explaining key aspects
of substantive divergence between the competition regimes of the EC and U.S..
Unfortunately, the teachings of the school and the role it has played in shaping antitrust
policy in Europe have largely escaped the attention of American commentators and
practitioners.57 Such a lack of attention is an explanatory factor for the kind of misguided
criticism cited above with respect to both GE/Honeywell and the proclaimed desire on
the part of the Commission to protect competitors at the expense of consumers. Given the
relatively obscure role of ordoliberal thinking and the importance it plays both with
respect to the future development of EC competition law and to international
harmonization, it is necessary to devote considerable time to the subject.

The Freiburg School’s teachings are decidedly more subtle than mere protection of
politically favored business and advocate a form of competition policy designed to
promote consumer welfare through the guaranteed provision of eclectic goods and
services, coupled with a libertarian right of access to markets, for both consumers and
businesses. Inherent in this philosophy is a constraint on mass accumulation of power and
57
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capital in the hands of any one entity. Essentially, ordoliberalism calls for ease of access
to information, freedom of choice and the equitable distribution of wealth – three features
that one would strain, employing any definition, to find unrelated to the notion of
consumer welfare. In sharp contrast, indeed, the Freiburg School is very much concerned
with promoting the well-being of consumers and it seems clear that its style of thinking
has been incorporated within the evolution of EC competition law. Yet, it is equally clear
that an irreconcilable tension may sometimes arise between furthering the goals of the
Freiburg School and maximizing consumer wealth in a manner consistent with Chicago.
It is this tension that has led, in part, to the divergence in substantive antitrust law
witnessed today.

•

The Roots of the Freiburg School

The substantive arguments of the Freiburg School cannot be understood without
reference to their historical development.58 Neoliberalism in Germany arose out of the
debacle that was the Weimar Republic and developed through the totalitarian and
oppressive Nazi regime. The neoliberal thinkers were repulsed by the economic and legal
structure that permeated the Weimar Republic and were equally aghast at the policies –
economic, social and political – of the Nazi era. Central to neoliberal thought was the
goal of preventing the emergence of the kind of institutional and socio-economic failures
that led to the turbulent and tragic history in question.
58
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The Weimer Republic arose following the controversial end to World War I, which many
Germans viewed with resentment, having held the belief that Germany was not in fact
losing the war. Much anger and bitterness was directed toward the Weimar Republic that
arose in the context of the pervasive mood of the day. Given this fact alone, the new
governmental structure faced grave difficulties. Perhaps inevitably, the institutions of the
Weimar Republic lacked legitimacy in the eyes of the public and this led to the
concomitant failure, and perhaps usurpation, of the judicial process. “Law increasingly
came to be viewed as a tool of power rather than a reliable social institution,”59 with the
ubiquitous nationalist support in the courts resulting in a number of miscarriages of
justice against socialists. This culminated in a profound public dissatisfaction and lack of
faith in the institutions of the government.

The economic structure of the Weimar Republic was similarly disastrous. In addition to
the ravages to the economy of war, the country faced heavy – some would say excessive
and unfair – reparations and an unprecedented inflation rate. Faced with such an
economic climate, it will be of little surprise to learn that the firms comprising the various
markets within the Republic sought action in concert to survive and to maintain
profitability. The result was an increasingly severe level of cartelization and a
concomitant predation of any firms wishing to engage in free competition.

Such was the context of the Nazi assumption of power in 1933.
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It was in 1933, during this chaotic time, that two lawyers – Franz Bohm and Hanns
Grossman – and one economist – Walter Eucken – crossed paths in the relatively
secluded town of Freiburg, only to discover “that they had similar readings of the failing
of Weimar and similar views of what to do about it.”60 They readily attributed the socioeconomic and political breakdown of the Weimar Republic to the fatally flawed legal
institutions and the resulting failure to check the abusive exercise of economic power by
cartels and monopolists. Due to Freiburg’s seclusion, members of the School were able to
pursue their scholarship throughout the Nazi era and, as a result, were uniquely placed at
the end of the war to provide a socio-economic model upon which to rebuild West
Germany – a model, of course, that was pleasing to the United States given its distance
from the extreme politics of the preceding era and those of the Soviet Union.

•

The Central Tenets of Ordoliberalist Thought

Given the historical context to the rise of the Freiburg School, the central tenets of
ordoliberalist thought are by no means shocking. As eloquently and succinctly explained
by David Gerber:

“Against the backdrop of chaos, devastation and amassed power, the ordoliberals
set out to create a tolerant and humane society that would protect human dignity
and personal freedom. Drawing on the central values of classical liberalism, they
envisioned a society in which individuals were as free as possible… The Weimar
experience led ordoliberals to demand the dispersion of not only political power,
but economic power as well. For most, this meant the elimination of monopolies.
For others, such as Wilhelm Ropke, the concentration of economic resources was
60
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an evil unto itself; they sought an economy composed, to the extent possible, of
small and medium-sized firms. Both groups tended to view economic
concentration with suspicion and sought to protect the existence and the economic
freedom of small and medium-sized businesses.”61

Thus, the Freiburg School does not seek to spurn the competitive process so as to protect
politically influential business or “state champions” at the expense of consumers. Rather,
it takes a hostile view to the accumulation of economic power within the control of a
single entity, recognizing such concentration as a potential danger to consumers and
society at large; such views emanating from the empirically unquestionable harm having
resulted from unchecked concentration during the Weimar Republic. Most interestingly,
this does not mean that the ordoliberals opposed competition. Quite to the contrary, they
embraced it, viewing an effective competitive process as being at the heart of a socioeconomic structure that would maximize consumer welfare and political stability, so as to
avoid the possibility of recidivism. Walter Eucken, a key figure in the rise of the Freiburg
School,62 envisioned an intense competitive process as being at the heart of reform.
Indeed, the greater the degree of competition, the more closely reality would match the
ordoliberal ideal.

Consistent with those who view the source of competition law as allocative efficiency,63
ordoliberals view price- or output-fixing concerted action as inimical to consumer
welfare. Indeed, insofar as both schools of thought recognize the possibility of improper
61
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exclusion of rival firms,64 both agree that prohibition of the offending practice is in
consumers’ best interests.

Nevertheless, the function and role of the competitive process conceived by the Freiburg
School is quite remarkably different, in many respects, from that pronounced by the
Chicago School, which seeks to maximize consumer wealth, even if achieving that
requires monopolization by the most efficient competitor. Rather, under the ordoliberal
view enunciated by Eucken, monopolization is to be avoided at all costs and access to the
markets must be guaranteed. No emergence of excessive economic power, or abuse of
such clout against rivals and potential entrants, can be tolerated, for it was precisely such
unchecked action that provided the backdrop for Germany’s tragic situation following
World War I.

An excellent contrast between the role of competition as envisioned by the Freiburg
School and those adhering to an economic approach is provided by Calixto Salomão
Filho, who writes:

“For the Ordo-liberals, the great advantage of the competition system is the fact
that through the transmission of information and freedom of choice, it allows the
discovery of the better available options and the most rational behaviors. This is
Hayek’s classic definition of the competition system as a Entdeckungsverfahren
(discovery process). The existence of a free choice process and discovery of the
best options in the market depends on not only the existence of a price that is not
altered by artificial offer and demand conditions, which would represent the
64
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marginal utility of a product, as the Neoclassics wish, but also on the existence of
actual or potential possibilities of choice among products, based on price, quality,
regional preferences, etc. The possibility of choice has its own value.”65

In essence, the role of competition under the Freiburg philosophy is to prevent
cartelization, monopolization and excessive concentration, to guarantee open access to
markets, to facilitate the free movement of goods and information and to generate
cooperation, coherence and political stability.66

•

The Incorporation of the Freiburg School into EC Competition Law

In some respects, it would initially seem surprising that a German school of socioeconomic thought, developed in large part during the time frame of, albeit in opposition
to, the Nazi regime, would come to pervade European competition policy. Yet, closer
inspection reveals a number of reasons why Germany did indeed play a particularly
influential role with respect to the development of EC competition law.67 First, with the
end of the war and in a political climate seeking economic cooperation, the Freiburg
School was uniquely equipped with socio-economic theories capable of providing the
65
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foundation for an economy based on the principles of integration and free market access.
Second, during the founding of the European Economic Community, “[m]ost of the
leading German representatives… were closely associated with ordoliberalism or at least
shared an appreciation of it.”68 Third, the Germans unquestionably had the most
experience with respect to competition law, having “just passed Europe’s first modern
competition statute. As a result, they emerged as leaders in this area – as illustrated, for
example, by the appointment of von der Groeben as the first Commissioner for
Competition Policy of the European Commission.”69

The overall result was that “ordoliberal thought set the tone for thinking about
competition law within the Communities.”70

We can now appreciate the importance of this school of thought in potentially explaining
some of the divergence between the U.S. and EC discussed above. Ordoliberal thinking
differs markedly from the economic thinking of the Chicago School and, to the extent
that its influence remains strong within Europe, it constitutes a possibly serious obstacle
to realizing the goals of global harmonization. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the
on-going influence of the Freiburg School in modern European competition law.

First, however, it is important to ask a fundamental question: in what respects, if any, are
the goals of the Freiburg School different from those simply designed to protect small
and medium-sized firms from their larger, more efficient, rivals? If the distinction is
68
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merely illusory, it will have major ramifications for the analysis conducted heretofore and
below.

•

Distinguishing ordoliberal thought from the mere protection of small business

It is unquestionably the case that ordoliberal competition policy often has protection of
weaker business as its effect. The vital question, therefore, is whether ordoliberal thought,
for all its ostensibly sophisticated theoretical foundation, is functionally equivalent to the
simple protection of politically favored business – an object discussed above and found,
for a number of reasons, to be disfavored. After all, what does it matter if protectionism is
the goal or effect of a practice when the end is the same?

The conclusion seems inescapable that, in many instances, there is little practical
difference between the two in terms of effect. Whether a court wishes to protect weaker
business against more efficient rivals on either the ground that said business is politically
favored, or on the ground of fairness, the legal ruling is likely to be analogous to that
applied in furtherance of ordoliberal principles seeking to avoid concentration. So
construed, the preceding discussion of the role of Freiburg in Europe serves an
explanatory role only and is, as a practical matter, defunct. The American criticism cited
in Section One as short-sighted could be astute after all.

However, it is submitted that an important difference between these two instructive
theories can and does arise. When the decisive factor is consumer welfare, as defined by
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the Freiburg School, rather than protection of business, one would expect to see instances
of increases in consumer wealth following a firm’s employment of an efficiencyenhancing practice to be weighed against the concern of elevated levels of concentration
in the future. Such an approach may lead, in some instances, to a clear divergence
between protectionist and ordoliberal principles. Of course, where a practice leads to the
elimination of all incumbent competition, though higher consumer wealth, one would
expect a Freiburg court to find the resulting concentration to be prohibitively malignant.
Yet, at the margin, evidence of a court disregarding significant, though not total, harm to
incumbent competitors in favor of immediate consumer welfare would provide
convincing evidence that Europe adheres to ordoliberal views, as contrasted to a basic
principle of protecting competitors as an end in and of itself.

It can now be demonstrated how Freiburg thinking is distinguishable from the protection
of politically influential business. Such protection takes place without regard to the best
interests of consumers. Protection of less efficient business under ordoliberal thinking is
quite different and is grounded in the notion of consumer welfare.

The significance of the Freiburg School in playing a role distinct from mere protectionist
principles is evident from a consideration of EC competition law.

First, clear evidence exists that dominant firms can monopolize a market, or otherwise
harm competitors, by virtue of its efficiency alone and where consumers benefit.71
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Moreover, dominant firms are permitted to injure their rivals when consumers benefit as
a result. Consider the case of Irish Sugar v. Commission, where the Court of First
Instance held that an undertaking’s protection of a dominant position “must… in order to
be lawful, be based on criteria of economic efficiency and consistent with the interests of
consumers.”72 Were a purely protectionist approach to be taken by the courts, it is
unlikely that a dominant firm would be allowed to injure its rival firms, even on the basis
of inherent efficiency. Instead, the CFI here provides an indication of the fact that EC
competition law seeks to protect consumers and where the efficiencies enjoyed by a
dominant firm are such as to outweigh concerns of concentration, the utilization of such
efficiencies should be permitted.

In this respect, EC law is analogous to the law as classically stated by Judge Learned
Hand in the United States: “a single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active
companies, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry… The successful
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.”73

Consider also the case of Atlantic Container Line AB v. Commission, which held that
even an agreement creating a dominant position, to the obvious detriment of the
contracting parties’ incumbent opposition, can take place without challenge under EC
competition law where such acquisition results from superior efficiency that will benefit
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consumers in the long run.74 Obviously such an agreement is to the disadvantage of all
competitors not privy thereto, but the court looked past the harm to individual
competitors to find a concomitant increase in consumer welfare likely to flow from the
agreement. This makes the distinction between ordoliberal and protectionist principles
explicit. The latter philosophy would condemn an agreement harming other competitors
in the market whereas the former would weigh the clear short-run consumer benefit
against the possible long-run harm thereto as a result of increasing concentration. Such
balancing under the ordoliberal view does not involve a foregone conclusion and where
the benefits of rising concentration to consumers are clear, Freiburg-based jurisprudence
will permit the acts in question.

In addition, a number of Commission decisions finding certain mergers to be compatible
with the common market have also focused on the benefit to consumers of the resulting
concentration in elevating the level of competition in the market. So, in the Saint-Gobain/
BPB merger, the Commission concluded that that the bundling likely to take place by the
merged entity would compel similar bundling on the part of incumbent competitors in
order to survive the enhanced level of competition to the ultimate benefit of consumers.75

The fact that European law seeks to protect consumers, and not necessarily competitors,
can be made clear employing a number of other explanatory cases, but the most succinct
of these must surely be Article 81(3), which allows the exemption of agreements whose
74
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anticompetitive effects are shown to be outweighed by benefits to consumers, as opposed
to competitors themselves.76

Evidence is provided by Article 81 (3)’s express requirement that a fair share of any
benefits from an agreement flow to consumers. This is, once again, consistent with
ordoliberal principles, but it is not clear that such a requirement would exist under a
purely protectionist regime. In such a context, one would imagine that the requirement
under 81(3) would be to the effect that no elimination of competitors would result from
the agreement in question. Yet, such is not the case. Instead, the closest provision is that
no substantial elimination of competition take place. Is this synonymous with harm to
competitors? There is reason to believe that it is not. First, the requirement of
“substantial” harm should be noted. Evidently, harm ensuing from an agreement to
competitors within a market will not prevent the application of Article 81(3) if it is not
sufficiently severe.

Perhaps the clearest evidence that consumer welfare – economically defined – is the
fundamental consideration in assessing the legality of potentially anticompetitive
agreements is provided by recent Commission Guidelines.77 Given that the European
Commission is the primary driving force behind EC competition law, evidence of its
belief that consumer welfare, as opposed to mere harm to competitors, is the fundamental
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of the Treaty, 2004 O.J. (C 101) 97, at 93.
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standard on which to base a judgment as to the legality of an agreement provides the
basis for the confident inference that EC antitrust is primarily concerned with consumers.

In the Guidelines, the Commission goes so far as to stress that efficiencies flowing to
consumers from an agreement may be subtle and one must take care to accurately
identify and weigh them against the competitive harms identified under Article 81 (1).78
The Commission’s focus on consumer welfare displayed a strong reliance on economic
theory, fully consistent within the context to the Chicago approach, emphasizing that:

“Cost efficiencies may in some circumstances lead to increased output and lower
prices for the affected consumers. If due to cost efficiencies the undertakings in
question can increase profits by expanding output, consumer pass-on may occur.
In assessing the extent to which cost efficiencies are likely to be passed on to
consumers…
All factors must normally be considered. Since Article 81(3) only applies in cases
where competition on the market is being appreciably restricted… there can be no
presumption that residual competition will ensure that consumers receive a fair
share of the benefits… it is necessary to balance the two opposing forces resulting
from the restriction of competition and the cost efficiencies. On the one hand, any
increase in market power caused by the restrictive agreement gives the
undertakings concerned the ability and incentive to raise price. On the other hand,
the types of cost efficiencies that are taken into account may give the
undertakings concerned an incentive to reduce price…
The effects of these two opposing forces must be balanced against each other. It is
recalled in this regard that the consumer pass-on condition incorporates a sliding
scale. When the agreement causes a substantial reduction in the competitive
constraint facing the parties, extraordinarily large cost efficiencies are normally
required for sufficient pass-on to occur.”
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Id. at 93.
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These 2004 Guidelines convincingly prove that EC competition law is far more
sophisticated than merely trying to protect competitors. Consumer welfare is at the heart
of the process and the Commission makes explicitly clear the fact that economic
efficiencies being passed onto consumers is of central importance and that even
substantial harm to competitors can be outweighed by elevated consumer wealth. In
addition, actual Article 81 (3) decisions demonstrate the importance of benefit to
consumers, as opposed to lack of harm to individual competitors.79

Given such reliance on consumer welfare, how can one explain the Commission’s
decision in GE/Honeywell? There, the U.S. Department of Justice approved the merger
on the ground of complementary effects likely to follow therefrom. Carlton and Perloff
describe the phenomenon as follows:

“[W]hen a single firm prices two complementary products, it takes into account that
lowering the price on one product will stimulate demand for the other. This demand
effect creates an incentive for the firm to set lower prices for both products than would be
set if each product were sold by a different firm. Thus, one should expect lower prices
and consumer benefits . . . ”80

On the basis of such reasoning, the Justice Department approved the merger for being in
furtherance of consumer welfare.81 Why did the European Commission not follow suit? Why did
it flaunt economic evidence of complementary effects increasing consumer welfare? Is it
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See, e.g., Visa International — Multilateral Interchange Fee, 2002 O.J. (L318) 17, [2003] 4
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enhancing network effects to be availed of by the agreement). See also TPS 1999 O.J. (L90) 6,
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80
CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 29.
81
U.S. Dep’t of Justice Press Release, Justice Department Requires Divestitures General Electric
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because the Commission abandoned its focus on consumers and instead adopted
protectionist principles, as has been suggested by a number of U.S. commentators? It
seems most unlikely. More probable is that the GE/Honeywell decision reflected the
Commission’s belief that the predicted long-run increase in concentration in the relevant
markets would be ultimately harmful to consumers. This is entirely consistent with
ordoliberal beliefs and reflects the philosophy that a lack of concentration in a market is
likely to a long-run furtherance of consumer welfare. It would appear that the decisive
factor in the Commission’s reasoning lay in its belief that GE/Honeywell’s increased
efficiency would lead to the long-run exit of incumbent competitors, with the result that
consumers would be denied meaningful choice.82 This is a clear manifestation of the
Freiburg School’s philosophy.

The tension between Freiburg and Chicago principles is very real. In the 2004
Guidelines, the Commission can plainly be seen adopting the latter view, insofar as it is
facilitative of the former. Meanwhile, other instances, as illustrated by GE/Honeywell,
have seen ordoliberal thinking clearly prevailing when placed in conflict with Chicago.
What is certain is that there is more to European jurisprudence than the mere protection
of incumbent business. The consumer appears to play the critical role.

•

Questioning the Role of Ordoliberalism in a Modern Europe
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General Electric/COMP/M.2220, EC Decision of July 3, 2001, at
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43

Having surveyed the various theoretical bases underpinning competition policy in Europe
and the United States, the crucially important task of identifying the optimal theory by
which to inform antitrust policy arises. Only when a single standard emerges will genuine
harmonization be able to take place between the U.S. and the EC. Until that time,
cooperation can be achieved and many, indeed most, cases will be resolved in parallel
manner, but when instances arise in which the two jurisdictions’ differing jurisprudential
bases come in conflict, more scenarios reminiscent of GE/Honeywell will occur. Taking
as given that both the U.S. and EC share the ultimate desire of maximizing consumer
welfare, the challenge is to identify which theory, or amalgam of theories, is most likely
to further this goal.

The continued presence of ordoliberal thought within EC competition policy in the 21st
century is the major point of contention for this paper. It will be argued that the Freiburg
School, while making a valuable and quite proper contribution to socio-economic
progress in its historical context, is now anachronistic and stands in the way of economic,
political and international progress. Indeed, it is submitted that the fundamental tenet of
the Freiburg School – that the competitive process will disintegrate and collapse into a
series of monopolized and heavily concentrated industries to the ultimate harm of
consumers and society83 – has not been borne out by the realities of the U.S. model. Such
a lack of faith in the functioning of the free market may be attributed to the historical
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Id. at 50 (“for Eucken and his colleagues, history -- particularly Weimar history -- had
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context in which ordoliberal thinking emerged. There is good reason to be more
optimistic about the self-correcting nature of competition today.

When one appreciates the further point that the various objections to monopolization,
highlighted within the discussion of the Chicago School, become reality when efficiencyand consumer-welfare enhancing business practices are forbidden on the grounds of
possible future levels of concentration, the conclusion seems almost inescapable that the
Freiburg School’s influence is no longer appropriate.

The strongest ground for the Freiburg approach relates to the alleged inability of
consumers to act in their best long-term interests. However, a careful consideration of
this assumption will demonstrate that it is ultimately unconvincing.

It was demonstrated above that protection of less efficient business under ordoliberal
thinking is quite different from a purely protectionist view and is grounded in the notion
of consumer welfare. How could it ever be necessary to protect consumers from their
own free will?, one might ask. Consumers can, and do, shop around for the best deals. If
they are attracted to lower prices, even from larger corporations, surely this is a
democratic expression of their preference? In such circumstances, one may readily
question the role of competition law in creating a barrier to consumers’ attainment of
those preferences.
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Yet, it may fairly be observed that this discussion places a lot of faith in consumers as a
group to act in furtherance of their best interests. Perhaps it is useful to relax this
assumption and analyze a more paternalistic view. What if consumers suffer from
myopia, being attracted to low prices without giving due regard to the level of
unwelcome concentration likely to follow in the long run? There is an extensive literature
on the problem of low-income segments of society who face significant capital
constraints discounting the future at a vastly excessive rate.84

Moreover, a classic collective action problem arises. While every consumer may desire a
lack of excessive concentration in the future, every consumer also has an incentive to free
ride off the actions of others. In other words, each consumer maximizes his utility by
availing of the low prices being offered by the increasingly large corporation whilst
relying on other consumers to spend greater amounts of money purchasing the same
goods from smaller, less efficient, businesses. This is a classic prisoners’ dilemma
situation. Each consumer’s dominant strategy is to purchase from the large firm at lower
prices, for if all other consumers purchase from small stores at high prices, the consumer
in question maximizes his possible payoff – lower prices now and a lack of excessive
concentration in the future. If other consumers purchase from the large, efficient, firm,
the consumer in question will not be unilaterally capable of preventing the future state of
concentration and may as well maximize his utility by availing of the low prices now. As
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See, e.g., Kirk R. Smith, Poverty and Climate Change: Cause, Effect, or Effect Modifier, at
http://ehs.sph.berkeley.edu/krsmith/publications/03_smith_3.pdf (“It is nearly a tautology to say
that poor people and their nations generally act as if they have short time horizons or, in the
jargon of the analyst, high discount rates. Anecdote and analysis confirm it.”)
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a result, the Nash equilibrium will result in increasing concentration, which is antithetical
to the joint maximization solution.

Taking these insights at face value, a significant problem arises with respect to the
Chicago approach. Defining the maximization of consumer welfare, as Chicago does, by
price and output, surely a danger readily emerges where consumers face a collective
action problem, or excessively discount the future state of the world, thatan unattractive
level of concentration will result? The Freiburg School would seem to think so and its
provisions implicitly recognize that competition law can be employed to defeat the
collective action problem above.

But this question is itself short-sighted, for if concentration of economic power in the
hands of major corporations is viewed as a source of disutility for consumers, who would
prefer access to family-owned and other small- and medium-sized businesses, then that
prevalent dissatisfaction translates into a major source of competitive advantage for such
businesses to enter the market once unwelcome concentration has taken place. This is the
critical point. One would expect rapid entry to avail of such demand.

If a market structure fails to induce entry by small and medium-sized business once an
“objectionable” and readily observable level of concentration has emerged, a strong
argument can be made for rejecting the principles of the Freiburg School.
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Importantly, with an unwelcome level of concentration having taken place, afflicted
consumers would be expected to actively purchase from small firms entering the market.
Excessive discounting of the future is no longer a problem once the future objectionable
state of the world has actually arisen. In addition, interest groups could be created by
consumer protection groups to help overcome the collective action problem. Moreover,
small firms could enter through a joint venture, using a common brand or trade mark as a
signaling effect to consumers of their small or familial status.

Thus, where no long-run entry is observed, the only explanation is that consumers are
benefiting from the low-cost pricing and do not, in fact, desire less efficient, small
business. Thus, a judicial or legislative rule providing a barrier to consumer welfareenhancing actions by “dominant” and efficient firms looks not like a paternalistic
protection of long-term consumer interests, but an authoritarian imposition of a political
viewpoint not shared by society’s constituents – consumers. This insight gains a special
force when one recognizes that majoritarian distaste of concentration is not required for
small- and medium-sized business to gain a competitive foothold. Even 5% of consumers
desiring the availability of family-owned enterprise provides a massive source of
business for such a company contemplating entry into the market. One would expect
limited entry, with 5% of consumers being supplied by small business, and the remaining
95% maximizing their utility by purchasing from the most efficient firms offering the
lowest prices. An absence of even limited scale entry strongly indicates a complete lack
of consumer demand for such family business and that consumers are in fact benefiting
from the lower prices.
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The strongest ground for rejecting the Freiburg School, however, relates to the rise of the
so-called “new economy,” which is playing an increasingly central and important role in
the global market. Such markets are often characterized by high fixed costs, economies of
scale and, hence, falling average costs in production with the result that the markets lack
a long-run competitive equilibrium.85 Such network industries are often said to have
“winner takes all” characteristics flowing from “tipping effects.” Enforcing ordoliberal
ideology in the context of the new economy is apt to be disastrous. Imposing a multi-firm
market structure on an industry whose underlying characteristics call for only one
manufacturer creates a situation of massive inefficiency. Prices will be far higher than
would be the case under unconstrained competition. Moreover, heavy administrative
expenses would have to be incurred to maintain an artificial equilibrium in the market
and these would constitute an additional loss.

In addition, the most meaningful form of competition with respect to the new economy
may relate to innovation and standard setting.86 Where “tipping effects” are especially
strong, leading to consumer acceptance of a sole standard, monopolization may be almost
inevitable. While the Freiburg School would not necessarily prohibit the existence of the
monopoly, if its emergence could not be practically avoided, it would both require open
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competition. The more protection from competition the firm that succeeds in obtaining a
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access to rivals and prohibit any practice creating a hindrance to free entry. Such
requirements serve to reduce the reward earned by the successful innovator. As such
potential innovators expend capital on their risky research and development on the basis
of recoupment and reward through subsequent monopoly, ordoliberal principles would
vastly truncate the ex ante expenditure on innovation, hence frustrating the emergence of
new economy industries. It is clear that ordoliberal policies are incompatible with the
competitive processes of the new economy. The consideration of the Commission’s
proposed remedy with respect to Microsoft below makes clear the damage likely to flow
from the Europeans’ treatment of exclusionary practices in this novel context.

Interestingly, however, the conclusion that the Freiburg School’s influence should be
filtered from EC competition law is not as straightforward as one would initially imagine,
given the force of the above concerns. Before concluding that a rejection of ordoliberal
jurisprudence within EC competition law should take place, a number of arguments for
continuing adherence to Freiburg shall be considered.

First, it is worth considering a possible economic base for the Freiburg School whereby
even an approach to antitrust in pursuit of maximization of consumer welfare may find
increasing concentration on grounds of efficiency objectionable.

From an economic perspective, the Freiburg School’s insight is most compelling in the
case of a firm whose efficiency in production enables it to achieve a monopoly, but where
the efficiency thus generated is outweighed by the social loss of the ensuing
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supracompetitive pricing. Assuming that no company is in a position by which to enter
and challenge this monopoly, due, for example, to the perceived likelihood of predatory
price-cutting behavior on the part of the incumbent,87 it may be that consumer welfare
would be maximized in the long run by employing competition law to prevent the
company attaining a monopolistic position in the first place. For this to be the case, the
constraining influence created by less efficient, incumbent competition on the price
elasticity of demand facing the efficient firm must be greater than that which would be
created by the threat of entry to the efficient firm were it allowed to attain a monopoly.

However, not only is there reason to be skeptical about the realism of such an outcome,
but the recognition of such a principle is apt to be extremely dangerous. This is
particularly so with respect to the incentive to compete aggressively on price, to innovate
and to engage in research and development. In short, recognition of such a principle
would blunt the fundamental process of competition. Rivalry between undertakings for
customers’ business leads to price-cutting, cost-reduction through increased efficiency
and innovation with the ultimate goal of increasing market share and profitability. The
imposition of a constraint on further growth by competition law would prevent further
desirable instances of this sort of competition. Moreover, it is apt to be prohibitively
difficult to accurately identify the point at which to employ the law to curtail the further
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Though not, interestingly, due to the fact that the entrant’s price would be above the
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growth in market share of an efficient company. It is likely that a large number of Type I
errors would result.88

The second obstacle to striking Freiburg principles from EC law lies in the following
observation: the recent enlargement of the European Union to incorporate ten additional
Member States, of which seven – the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Hungary and Slovenia – had Communist or Socialist regimes during the Cold
War period, provides an economic situation more akin to the context in which the
Freiburg School arose than would the modern economies of the western European
countries and the United States. As a result, ordoliberal thinking may still have a role to
play with respect to these economically developing countries. The relevant issue is which
jurisprudential foundation of competition law – allocative efficiency or ordoliberalism –
would be expected to most effectively aid in these countries’ economic development.
Given the overwhelming economic support for free trade through comparative – as
opposed to absolute – advantage,89 a strong case can be made that a competition policy
focusing on allocative efficiency, which would facilitate a country’s maximization of
comparative advantage by minimizing domestic costs of production, would be best
placed to enable these developing Member States to successfully integrate with the
European Union.
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Third, and as was considered above, a unique and fundamentally important characteristic
of EC competition law isthe overriding priority given single market integration. The case
can reasonably be made that ordoliberal thought, with its emphasis on keeping access to
markets open and unhindered provides an ideal foundation upon which to base a
competition policy that seeks to guarantee transparency between its Member States’
borders. The United States simply does not share such a goal in employing its antitrust
regime and, if some divergence in international competition policy emerges, perhaps it is
simply unavoidable. Critical to resolution of this issue will be the predicted effect on
single market integration of a competition regime dedicated solely to achieving allocative
efficiency and consumer welfare maximization.

Perhaps, some would argue that the ideal outcome is for the EC and the U.S. to adopt an
amalgam of the Chicago and Freiburg Schools, in which the gains of allocative efficiency
are recognized, but subject to the limit that excessive concentration may represent a
social evil over the long-run, short-run efficiencies notwithstanding. This would involve
the United States, as opposed to the European Community, altering its antitrust policy,
perhaps in a manner more reflective of ordoliberal thinking. This suggestion is by no
means unprecedented. 90 This is due to the fact that European competition law currently
represents such an amalgam, with neither the Freiburg nor Chicago School influences
enjoying unqualified application, rather each being applied in proportion to the other.

Yet, while such an approach has some theoretical backing within the European Union,
given the single market integration imperative, it is not at all clear why such an approach
90
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would be optimal within the United States. Moreover, and as was outlined above, the
market integration principle is by no means diametrically opposed to the pursuit of
economic efficiency. It follows that ordoliberal thinking can be jettisoned in light of
modern economic thought and an antitrust policy in pursuit of consumer wealth adopted,
qualified only by those instances where efficiency-enhancing practices would
nevertheless create a long-run obstacle to the single market.

It is submitted that an economic approach to competition policy, as a modified variant of
the Chicago School theory, is not only the best route by which to maximize consumer
welfare, but, critically, is also generally consistent with the single market imperative that
underlies the jurisprudence of the EC generally.

In order to gain an appreciation of how ordoliberal thought pervades European antitrust,
it is best to compendiously survey a number of branches of the law. Adopting the
fundamental teaching of the Chicago School that consumer welfare is to be furthered by
lower prices and higher output as the optimal standard, we can therefore proceed to
identify representative areas of divergence. In so doing, it must be recalled that the
ultimate goal from this paper’s perspective is to achieve the greatest possible allocative,
distributive and productive efficiency and, ceteris paribus, the most effective way to
attain this goal is to promote the process of vigorous competition so as to avoid cases of
monopoly. It will be concurrently shown how the law covering these areas can be
amended in a manner reflective of the principles outlined above and how such
amendment will be to the benefit of consumers and the economy as a whole.
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Identifying and Challenging the Freiburg School in EC Competition Law

It is unquestionable that the message of the Freiburg School can still be seen pervading
EC competition law, particularly with respect to the scrutiny given the requirement of
fairness on the part of dominant firms’ behavior and the hostility with which any
exclusionary actions are viewed, irrespective of the efficiency underlying such conduct.

In particular, the “as if” aspect of ordoliberal competition policy, which requires
monopolists to behave “as if” they faced competition,91 features heavily in the European
Court of Justice’s rulings with respect to the concept of “abuse of dominant position.”
The fact of dominance itself is not prohibited. Divestiture is not sought. Instead, and in
contrast to the approach typically adopted in the United States, firms classified as
dominant face equitable constraints on their behavior, being subjected to a “special
responsibility” not to behave unfairly,92 even where consumer welfare is not threatened.93
In effect, such firms are required to behave “as if” they were not dominant. Yet, the
European definition of fairness goes even further by prohibiting dominant firms from
91
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performing acts that non-dominant firms are free to do. The result may be thought of as
the effective imposition of a penalty upon a firm whose success leads it to dominance.94
A particularly pertinent example of this involves Article 82 (2)(a) EC’s prohibition of
abusively high pricing.95 American law has no similar provision. But, given the
importance of the schism possibly at issue, it is important to make explicit a number of
the major characteristics of EC law that can plausibly be explained by ordoliberal
thinking and to demonstrate how the introduction of an economic approach would lead to
superior outcomes. To do so, three unilateral business practices indicative of the
European incorporation of ordoliberal thinking will be compendiously considered.

1) Predatory Pricing

The process by which a dominant firm forces competitors from a market through
“unfairly” low pricing encapsulates quite succinctly the various socio-economic
objections of the Freiburg School, in addition to the political hostility toward large
corporations whose pricing eliminates small- and medium-sized, often family-owned,
business. It was argued above that these concerns are no longer appropriate within the
modern European market.
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The European Court of Justice has viewed low pricing leading to increasing
concentration with hostility.96 Strong evidence of this exists. First, the fact of harm to
business is sufficient. A plaintiff need not prove any long-run detriment to consumer
wealth in the form of likely higher prices in future periods under EC competition law.97

Second, a plaintiff need not prove that the dominant firm’s pricing was so low as to be
inconsistent with its short-run profit maximization. Rather, evidence of a dominant firm’s
pricing below average total cost (ATC), though above average variable cost (AVC),
coupled with intent to eliminate a competitor, will constitute a violation of Article 82
EC.98 Economics teaches us that a firm should continue to operate at optimum capacity
and, in cases of low demand, should price anywhere above AVC in the short-run. In other
words, rational, short-run profit maximizing behavior on the part of a business may be
deemed “predatory” under EC law. This is inconsistent with the fundamental tenet of the
offense, namely that a predatory firm must necessarily forego profitability in a particular
period in order to make greater profits in the future. A firm being free to act in a manner
consistent with its immediate, first order condition for profit maximization is central to
the workings of a free economy. Yet, if such low pricing leads to objectionable
concentration, ordoliberal concerns are nevertheless raised.
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Nonetheless, it was stressed above, in rejecting the notion that consumers cannot act in
their own interests, that a lack of entry into a market by small business charging higher
prices in the presence of a low pricing corporation strongly implies that consumers are
benefiting from the latter’s presence. Thus, under no circumstances should such low
pricing, even below cost pricing, be prohibited where the low-pricing firm does not
obtain monopoly power as a result. In essence, low pricing in a single period to the
benefit of consumers, as evidenced by their purchases from the “predatory” firm, is
unobjectionable if supracompetitive prices cannot be charged later.

Consistent with this reasoning, the U.S. Supreme Court has required proof of a
“dangerous probability of recoupment” in predatory pricing claims.99 The Chicago
approach to antitrust counsels lower prices and higher output as the key to higher
consumer welfare. In this sense, therefore, competition authorities should be slow to
place any barriers in the path of vigorous price competition. Recognizing that below-cost
pricing is to the unequivocal short-run benefit of consumers, American courts require
proof of likely future harm thereto. If no danger of such harm is apparent, for example
because barriers to entry to the market in question are slight, U.S. law declines to prohibit
the practice, recognizing instead that the entire episode resulted in heightened consumer
wealth, harm to incumbent competitors notwithstanding. Moreover, the requirement of
likely future harm serves to reduce the probability of erroneous judicial determination.
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This clear divergence in substantive law directly reflects the adherence to differing
schools of thought – Chicago versus the amalgam of theoretical bases in Europe. The
policies and conclusions discussed heretofore counsel an amendment in this area of
European law.

2) Product Tying

Perhaps the most economically complex unilateral business practice relates to a firm’s
imposition of a tie-in. Product tying can be usefully employed as a framework in which to
apply the advocated economic approach and to discard the ordoliberal philosophy still
underlying EC competition law. The two approaches – Freiburg and Chicago – are
diametrically opposed in this context and, in addition, adherence to ordoliberal views
within the context of product tying is likely to be heavily inimical to consumer welfare.
Coupled with the observation that the major instances of international divergence have
arisen in the context of tie-ins,100 the need to address the subject becomes compelling.

For the purposes of the following discussion, the extreme assumptions shall be made that:
(1) the tying firm has a complete monopoly over the tying market, (2) prior to the tie, the
tied market was subject to perfect competition, with price equal to the marginal cost of
production, and (3) the only consumers of tied products are those who also consume the
100
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corresponding tying products and derive a higher degree of utility from the latter. Only in
such rare circumstances will a tying firm be able to acquire monopoly market share of the
tied market so that genuine ordoliberal issues will be raised. It will therefore be assumed
that the imposition of a tie confers a monopoly market share on the tying firm in the tied
market, which was formerly subject to perfect competition.

The tension between the Freiburg and Chicago Schools is particularly acute because
market share acquired through product tying, though elevating concentration, is highly
unlikely to confer market power on the tying firm, save where the tying and tied goods
are complementary.101

A tying firm will necessarily be unable to charge a double monopoly mark-up.102
Assuming that it is already charging a monopoly price in the tying market, should it
attempt to tie a second good at a supracompetitive price it will effectively elevate its price
in the tying market to beyond the profit-maximizing level. If such ties cannot reduce
consumer welfare, why are they imposed? The answer, almost certainly, is due to the
efficiencies underlying tying arrangements.103

Nevertheless, care should be taken with respect to the double monopoly mark-up
constraint in the context of complementary goods. If atying firm has market power in the
tying market, does it make a difference whether such power is exercised in the tied as
opposed to tying market?
101
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Not if the tying firm engages in bundling. Where a firm engages in fixed proportions
tying, it will be incapable of diminishing consumer welfare – as goods are bundled, if
consumers in the tied market are made worse off by a tie, the consumers in the tying
market necessarily benefit to a commensurate degree and vice versa. Fixed proportions
bundling cannot, therefore, raise consumer welfare issues absent extraordinary
circumstances.104

Variable proportions requirements contracts, however, present a more complicated
situation in which tying may reduce consumer welfare in one market by more that it
increases such welfare in the other market.105 As the tying market is already monopolized
and, by assumption, a monopoly price was being charged prior to the introduction of the
tie, the tying firm will maximize profit by reducing that monopoly price in the tying
market to avail of the demand-elevating effects created thereby in the tied market.
Simultaneously, the tying firm will increase the price in the tied market to increase its
profits. This is because zero economic profits were being enjoyed there due to the fact
that price equaled marginal cost before the tie.106 As a result, prices in both the tying and
tied markets will be somewhere between the competitive and monopoly prices;
consumers will be better off in the tying market and worse off in the tied market. Which
effect is greater?
104
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The answer necessarily depends on the underlying relation between the market demand
curves in the tying and tied markets and is therefore somewhat ambiguous. Nevertheless,
given the underlying assumption that the consumers of the tying product derive greater
utility therefrom than they do from the tied product, it is more likely than not that a
reduction in the price of the tying product will increase consumer welfare by more than a
rise in the price of the tied product will reduce it.

Even where complementary goods are involved, therefore, overall consumer welfare is
likely to rise, even if market power is exercised over two markets.107

Thus, a court adopting a consumer welfare standard – economically defined – would
generally approve such tying arrangements for contributing to efficiency and consumer
wealth. In contrast, a Freiburg court would find a quintessential violation of competition
law in the circumstances due to the concentration and reduction in consumer choice
involved. Moreover, a barriers to entry theory would likely be adopted in that potential
entrants to the tied market would be unable to directly access consumers, having to enter
both the tying and tied markets together,108 which of course violates a major ordoliberal
goal. From an economic perspective, however, this issue is moot because allocative
efficiency only desires entry by a rival equally or more efficient than the incumbent. A
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basic insight, based on Coasian economics,109 is that a more efficient entrant will not be
barred from the tied market: he will merely contract with the incumbent who will
outsource production, thereby increasing profits, while the efficiency saving in
production will be passed onto the consumers in the form of lower prices. Moreover,
should he wish to sell directly to consumers, he can enter both the tying and tied markets
simultaneously. As capital markets generally work efficiently, access to the requisite
capital to enter on such a large scale would only be frustrated were there a high risk of a
post-entry insolvency-producing equilibrium resulting.110 Given that the incumbent is
enjoying monopoly profits, post-entry insolvency is highly unlikely111 and, thus, access to
capital will not constitute a barrier to entry.

Europe has unsurprisingly fallen on the ordoliberal side of the line. Where a dominant
firm imposes a tie, a violation of Article 82 EC automatically follows.112
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Intriguingly, however, the United States does not represent a shining beacon of perfection
with regard to the employment of economically-informed antitrust principles within the
field of tying practices. It is amusing to note that some of the most scathing and derisive
criticism emanating from America toward Europe has been made in the context of tying
law – a field where the U.S. has quite similarly failed to employ price theory correctly
and which has thereby created a situation open to the identical criticism that it serves to
protect competitors from more efficient rivals. Indeed, historically at the time of the
Warren Court, the United States would have been more prone to that same criticism than
Europe has ever been.113

Nevertheless, there is evidence of U.S. law’s potential move away from the standard of
per se illegality. First, the Supreme Court has come close, 4-5, to reversing that
standard.114 While the Court has not taken the opportunity to make this dissenting opinion
binding law in subsequent cases,115 it at least demonstrates that the leverage and
foreclosure theories of tying do not enjoy ubiquitous support within the highest levels of
American jurisprudence.116 It suggests too that as the economic approach to antitrust
becomes further engrained, the Court may indeed abandon its traditional position.
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Second, a modern move in American law away from per se illegality exists with respect
to physical integration. Where two goods are physically integrated, which, as an
economic matter, is analogous to a bundle, the law is dramatically different. Here,
legality is effectively presumed and only where a showing that the integration serves no
consumer purpose will illegality follow.117

Third, a clear move away from the traditional position has arisen with regard to the new
economy. The Microsoft case saw the D.C. Circuit enunciate a rule of reason approach to
product tying in the context of high-technology, software markets.118

Finally, when one considers that U.S. law has adopted an economic approach to most
other areas of antitrust law and that such an approach is therefore likely to eventually
permeate through to tying arrangements, it seems reasonable to observe that a gulf exists,
and is likely to grow considerably larger, between the U.S. and EC treatment of tie-ins.
As a result, the economic approach advocated heretofore would serve to bring U.S. law to
the destination to which it is already gravitating, whilst simultaneously achieving
international harmonization within this area of law.\

3) Refusal to Supply
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The need to jettison ordoliberal principles from European law can be well illustrated by
an examination of the EC’s treatment of mandatory access. Unsurprisingly, the entire
concept of refusal to supply can be seen to mirror the Freiburg School, which seeks to
prohibit any actions, concerted or otherwise, that may create obstacles to a rival firm or
consumer accessing a market. It is well settled under EC law that a dominant firm cannot
unilaterally decide to cease supplies to downstream companies where the dominant
undertaking.119 Indeed, the concept of mandatory access has been taken so far under
European law that it has even been applied in a compulsory dealing context – very much
akin to copyright law.120

The danger inherent in compelling open access remedies a la Freiburg can be made most
clear through an illustrative model. A pertinent and topical example can be employed in
relation to the recent action against Microsoft for product tying.

Adopting the goals of free access to markets and preservation of consumer choice, the
Commission implemented a remedy requiring Microsoft to disclose the interfaces
necessary to enable rivals to achieve interoperability with the Windows operating
system.121 The quasi-open source remedy sought by the Commission is controversial.
One may initially take the view that by compelling the emergence of interoperability, the
Commission will unequivocally increase the level of competition within the market. But
this view is necessarily correct only if one views the market in a static context. By
119
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attempting to improve ex post access to the relevant market, the Commission may,
ironically, cause substantial long-term harm.

This point can be made explicit through game theory. The assumptions made for the
purposes of the model are, by design, extreme, so as to make evident the potential harm
ensuing from the Commission’s remedy.

The validity of former Competition Commissioner Mario Monti’s belief that the remedy
imposed “restores the conditions for fair competition in the markets concerned”122
depends critically on the fundamental, and readily questionable, assumption that, by the
time of effective monopolization of Windows operating software, Microsoft will have
been adequately compensated through its pre-judgment enforcement of proprietary rights
and post-“dilution” income.123 The critical issue pertains to proper incentive creation. Ex
post evidence of sufficient compensation makes a good case for allowing free access,
except of course for the consequent effect on further potential innovation. More clear is
the likely effect on would-be developers of platform standards, in the form of on ex ante
incentives, under a regime where success guarantees disenfranchisement of proprietary
rights. An application of basic game theory may help to make this clear.

In a one-shot game, where, for the sake of simplicity, two rivals, Alpha and Beta, are in
the process of developing competing standards, the dominant strategy will be for both
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competitors to seek to monopolize the market to maximize their single-period pay-off
/2) is greater than the profit from

where the expected value of intense innovation (

H

engaging in only a minimal level of innovation (

M

). The Nash equilibrium will be at the

socially optimal level with each company dedicating a high level of capital. It is assumed
that the market is one characterized by “tipping phenomenon” after a sufficiently high
level of innovation:

Beta

KB = low

Alpha

KA = low

M

KA = high

H

Where K = capital invested;

,

KB = high

0,

M

,0

H
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/2,

/2.

H

= high level of profit;

M

= a moderate level of profit

consistent with a Cournot-Nash equilibrium in a duopoly; and
between a high level of profit and zero profit (exit).
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H

/2= 50/50 chance

H

In a multi-period world without a determined end, however, the resulting incentives may
be rendered perverse by implementation of the Commission’s remedy. Both competitors
know ex ante that their rewards will drop to zero if either’s platform becomes the
universal standard for the market in question.124 This fact markedly reduces their
incentive to engage in the kind of intense innovation that is likely to lead to
monopolization. Instead, both parties know that their best strategy may be to produce
platforms of a more homogeneous quality with neither seeking to innovate with the level
of enthusiasm, or, indeed, through the dedication of sufficient capital, to produce
platforms of the quality available in a “first-best” world.

Given the single-period payoff matrix, Alpha and Beta will engage in intense innovation
(KA = KB = high) only if:
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Assuming constant discount rate and profit levels, the socially desirable level of
innovation will materialize only if:
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This, of course, is an unrealistic assumption, for the winner will continue to reap financial
reward from its innovation. Nevertheless, any kind of compulsory access reduces the expected
return from innovation and, hence, blunts the incentive to engage in research and development ex
ante. The potential consequences of an open access remedy can be made most clear, however,
through the adoption of extreme assumptions.
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H

2

>

M

i

Waldman & Jensen estimate most firms’ real-life discount rates as typically being
between 0.05 and 0.1.125 Taking it as 0.05, then the socially outcome will arise only if:

H

> 40

M

That is, only if the single-period profit from successfully monopolizing the market is at
least forty times higher than the single-period profit from engaging in little innovation
will the desirable level of investment occur. This may or may not be the case, but there is
certainly no reason to assume that the level of profits earned will be sufficient as to have
spurred the innovation.

Clearly this fear could be allayed somewhat by arguing that in marginal cases
competition policy should still err on the proprietary side of the line, but it surely remains
the case that it is the duty of any responsible antitrust policy to further investigate the
likely effect on incentive-creation by the proposed approach.

Of course, the European Commission would no doubt argue that only where the desired
level of investment has in fact occurred should an open access regime in the form of
compulsory interoperability be implemented. But the point of the above exercise is to

125

WALDMAN & JENSEN, supra note 31.

70

show that, by implementing such a policy once, regulators cannot credibly commit to not
doing so again, with the resulting effects on incentives outlined above.

Insofar as the Commission decision stands for the precedent that winners within new
economy industries will have their reward curtailed through the imposition of
interoperability remedies, it creates a significant danger of in fact reducing the level of
the important form of competition in “winner takes all” markets. As was argued above,
the truly meaningful and desirable form of competition with respect to the new economy
may well take place in research and development to establish standards. Post-success
monopoly profits, while in static context a clear source of disutility to consumers, is a
necessary condition for pre-establishment competition to take place. There is reason to
believe the post-success monopoly pricing will be ephemeral if a socially-desirable form
of research and development by the incumbent monopolist does not take place, for it will
quickly be displaced.126 The prohibition of practices likely to prevent that displacement
on grounds other than efficiency should be pursued especially vigorously in this context,
but it was readily shown that the product tying taking place with respect to Microsoft
probably did not have such an objectionable effect.

It may be concluded that the Microsoft litigation provides both a source of hope with
respect to U.S. development in product tying law, with a more flexible rule of reason
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approach being adopted, and a reason for despair with regard to Europe. It is clear that
ordoliberal policies remain as firmly engrained as ever. Litigation in the context of the
new economy could have provided the perfect setting for a review of the European
approach and it is most disappointing that it did not take place.

•

Conclusion

Europe is now faced with difficult choices with respect to the future direction of its
evolving competition regime. While the Chicago School and post-Chicago literature have
fused in the United States to ensure a central role for microeconomics, game theory and
empiricism, no similar foundational principle is readily observable underlying EC
competition law. The dangers associated with this are numerous. First is the danger to
legal certainty within Europe itself. The current body of European antitrust law reflects a
number of philosophical approaches to competition policy which are not readily
reconcilable and which, in many circumstances, are inherently contradictory. EC
competition law thus finds itself in an uneasy resting place, precariously balancing the
often diametrically opposed socio-economic philosophies of consumer wealth, market
integration, equity and ordoliberalism. A schism between practice and theory creates an
imbalance and this imbalance, if not addressed, may eventually become perilous.

72

Second, and most importantly, achieving effective antitrust harmonization has never been
so vital as it is in the context of the increasing globalization of markets. Great steps have
been, and continue to be, made in this regard, which should be applauded. Nevertheless,
pure harmonization will forever remain elusive so long as fundamental and unequivocal
standards by which to inform competition policy fail to emerge on both sides of the
Atlantic.

The analysis advocated by this paper finds attractive and relatively straight forward
resolution when employed through the lens of modern economics with the goal of
maximizing consumer welfare. The employment of price theory as a means by which to
maximize consumer wealth carries a concomitant plethora of beneficial effects, including
the increasing international competitiveness of European industry, the lowering of
inflation and facilitates a most fundamental form of democratic expression: enabling the
public at large to decide the ultimate success or failure of businesses catering thereto.
There is a strong argument that the grounds calling for the paternal state no longer exist,
or exist to such a truncated degree as to no longer be worthy of antitrust concern.

It is understandable that the unwavering, pro-consumer principles advocated heretofore
may sit uncomfortably with some observers. Even putting aside the counter-intuitive
nature of some aspects of industrial organization, it may be difficult for some to accept
the premise that an unchallenged rise in concentration on the basis of efficiency within
European markets will be to the ultimate benefit of all involved, given the European
history of such market structures. Yet, it is submitted that forceful, critical and directed
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insight into the economics of the situation will reveal, not a draconian and right-wing
amalgamation of legal principles but, a well reasoned, perspicacious and ultimately
welfare-enhancing legal framework to launch the European Union into the 21st century as
one of the world’s greatest, and most competitive, economic powers.

Competition policy setters in Europe are now faced with, what may be fairly
characterized as, an exigency in deciding whether to increase the level of critical,
economic insight into the doctrines pervading the law. It is indeed true that the “European
Union is at a crossroads as to whether it will move to the dominant U.S. paradigm.”127
The sooner Europe moves toward adopting economics as the sole guide to dictating
antitrust policy, the better off the consumers and the economies of the Member States of
the European Union will be. Unqualified antitrust harmonization with respect to the
United States awaits such an evolution. While the obstacles to achieving this goal are
immense, it is the optimistic belief of the author that such change is possible. To quote
the recent, encouraging aspirations of the current European Competition Commissioner:

“I think that competition policy evolves as our understanding of economics evolves. In
days gone by, “fairness” played a prominent role in [U.S.] enforcement in a way that is
no longer the case. I don’t see why a similar development could not take place in
Europe.”128
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Statement of Originality:

The foregoing piece has been inspired through research for my Ph.D degree, which is in
its terminal stages. I have read widely on the topic in question and can confidently state
that the above Note is original. While much academic comment exists on the nature and
evolution of U.S. antitrust law, American treatment of both European competition policy
and the source of transatlantic divergence is rather sparse. This is especially true with
respect to the Freiburg School of ordoliberalism. David Gerber, cited above in the Note,
is one of very few authors to have explored the background of that school in detail.
Nevertheless, no substantive critique of the role of Freiburg within Europe has been
furthered within the U.S. literature, either in isolation or in the transatlantic context
portrayed above.
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